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THE CITY OF GOLDEN'S APPLICATION FOR
SURFACE WATER RIGHTS: A KAYAK COURSE,
INSTREAM FLOW, DILUTION, OR WHAT?
AMY BEATIE AND JAMES FOSNAUGHT
1.

INTRODUCTION

The City of Golden, Colorado ("Golden") has submitted an
application' to the District Court, Water Division 1, in the State of
Colorado, for confirmation of absolute surface water rights for eight
existing structures in Golden's White Water Rafting Course ("Course")
on Clear Creek in Jefferson County, Colorado, and for conditional
water rights for ten structures Golden intends to add to the course. 2
Various local governments and private water users have filed
statements of opposition to Golden's application. The application tolls
four primary issues that have potentially wide reaching effects on water
allocation: (1) whether Golden "can and will" complete the
conditional appropriations; (2) whether Golden's application
constitutes an instream flow which, by statute, only the Colorado Water
Conservation Board may acquire and administer; (3) whether the
appropriations constitute waste; and (4) whether the appropriation
will affect upstream future developments.
II.

CAN AND WILL DOCTRINE

The statements of opposition raise the issue of whether the City of
Golden "can and will" put the requested conditional water rights to
beneficial use.' In Colorado, an applicant for a conditional water right
1. For a more detailed description of the application and statements of
opposition, see the Colorado Water Rights Applications section of this issue, infra at
358.
2. City of Golden Application for Surface Water Rights, Case No. 98CW448
(Water Division 1, December 10, 1998) (hereinafter Golden's Application].
3. Filed on March 3, 1999, the City of Arvada's statement of opposition requests
that Golden be held to strict proof with respect to "whether the claimed conditional
appropriations can and will be completed with diligence and within a reasonable
time." City of Arvada Statement of Opposition, § 2(B) (4). Filed on January 26, 1999,
Coors Brewing Company's statement of opposition states that, "[i]f it is proven that a
lawful appropriation has been made, Applicant must then demonstrate that the water
rights can and will be administered in priority." Coors Brewing Company Statement of
Opposition, § 2(G). Filed on March 3, 1999, the Town of Georgetown's statement of
opposition requests Golden be held to strict proof about, "[tihe reasonably
anticipated future legal and physical availability of water for water rights sought."
Town of Georgetown Statement of Opposition, § 3(E)(1).
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must show that the water "can be and will be diverted, stored, or
otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially
used and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and
within a reasonable time.""
The can and will requirement, codified in 1979, is a relatively new
addition to Colorado water law.' The primary goal of the statute's
enactment is to prevent speculation.6 Section 305(b) requires an
applicant to establish a substantial probability that the intended
appropriation can and will reach fruition.7
When reviewing an application for satisfaction of the can and will
doctrine, a court will consider economic capability, need, present
availability of water, the feasibility of the project, and whether the
applicant can complete the project with diligence and within a
reasonable time.' One commentator stated that, although statutory
language fails to address many of the issues that have been litigated
under the rubric of the can and will doctrine, precedent had dictated
that the Colorado judiciary "address heretofore unconsidered issues of
public interest when adjudicating conditional water rights."9
Under section 305(9) (b) an applicant must make a threshold
showing of the reasonable availability of water to put to beneficial use
to prove that the applicant "can" complete the appropriation.'
In
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highland Limited Partnership,"
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that an applicant must
demonstrate the availability of water based upon the "river conditions
existing at the time of the application, in priority and on sufficiently
frequent occasions, to enable the applicant to complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time." 2 The
court, recognizing the necessity of imputing reasonableness into this
availability, noted that availability is based upon "necessarily imperfect
predictions of future events and conditions.' 3 The court further
stated, "[a] showing of reasonable availability does not require a
demonstration that water will always be available to the full extent
applied for in the decree.' 4 The court rejected an argument that the
4. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (1998).
5. City of Thorton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 42 (Colo. 1996).
6. Id. (noting legislative goal of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-305(9) (b) is to reduce
speculation associated with conditional decrees and to increase the certainty of the
administration of water rights in Colorado).
7. Id.
8. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715,
718 (Colo. 1984).
9. Mark E. Hamilton, The "Can and Will" Doctrine of Colorado Revised Statute Section
37-92-305(9)(b): Changingthe Nature of Conditional Water Rights in Colorado, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 947, 963 (1994).
10. Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Hines Highland Ltd. Part., 929 P.2d 718, 722
(Colo. 1996).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 43 (Colo. 1996).
14. Id. at 724.
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applicant show, in order to obtain a conditional decree, that water will
be available at any time the applicant wishes to make a diversion. 5
The court held that in order to promote development and maximize
utilization, an applicant for a conditional water right "need only prove
that there is a substantial probability that the appropriation can and
will be completed . . 6
Clear Creek is greatly overappropriated.17 In Hines, Maroon Creek
was underappropriated. Because the decrees sought by Golden do not
remove water from the stream bed, the over or underappropriation of
the stream is less significant as it applies to senior appropriators. Once
the junior appropriator has obtained a conditional water right decree
the junior may not, when prior appropriators need the water, make a
diversion.' The key element needed for Golden to prove it "can"
perfect the right is that enough water actually exists for the City to
complete its appropriation. In Florence, the court rejected a probability
that an appropriation would become available once every twenty-five
years as insufficient to determine that a conditional decree "can"' be
completed.' 9 Golden is better able to show the availability of water.
The U.S. Geologic Survey measures the actual and estimated
streamflow on surface waters throughout Colorado. Diagram 1 shows
the actual and estimated streamflow of Clear Creek at Golden for the
years 1981 through 1997. Peak flows during the May, June, and July
period have exceeded 1,000 CFS in eight of the seventeen years.
Diagram 2 shows the actual or estimated flows for 1996, in which the
flow exceeded 1,000 CFS for a period of approximately four weeks
during the month of June. Because historically water has been
available, it is likely that Golden can satisfy the requirement of section
305-that it can and will be able to complete the diversion.

15. Id. In footnote 13, court states that this requirement would make it impossible
for any new applicant to obtain conditional water rights. Id.
16. Id at 724.
17. City of Thornton v. Clear Creek Users Alliance, 859 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Colo.
1993). The court notes in footnote 4 that a 1985 a report prepared for the Denver
Board of Water Commissioners indicated that the "[p] resent use made of Clear Creek
water is a mix of municipal, industrial, and agricultural. The stream is greatly overappropriated, with water rights totaling about 20 times the average rate of stream flow
and about 50 percent more than the maximum recorded flow during the past ten
years." Id.
18. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(d) (1998).
19. Southeastern Colo.Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715
(Colo. 1984).
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20. USGS Website for Historical Streamflow Daily Values (visited April 25, 1999)
<http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis-w/CO/?statnum=06719505>.
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INSTREAM FLOW APPROPRIATIONS

Golden's application seeks confirmation of absolute rights and
additional conditional rights for the Course. The diversions do not
remove water from the watercourse of Clear Creek. Of the eight
objectors, five object either overtly22 or impliedly s to the application
due to, inter alia,its resemblance to an instream flow.
In Colorado, authority to appropriate or acquire water for an
instream flow resides solely with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board ("CWCB"). The relevant statutory provision states that:
[T] he Colorado water conservation board is hereby vested with the
exclusive authority... to appropriate... such waters of natural
streams and lakes as the board determines may be required for
minimum stream flows.., to preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree....

[N]o other person or entity shall be granted a

decree adjudicating a right to water.., for instream flows in a ....
stream
24
channel between specific points.., for any reason whatsoever
The objectors assert that Golden's failure to physically divert water
from the stream creates an instream flow right, a right exclusively
vested in the CWCB, thereby causing Golden's application to fail as a
legally cognizable claim. Whether Golden's application falls under the
rubric of an instream flow will turn upon analysis of several Colorado
water statutes and the water court's interpretation of the applicability

22. Clear Creek Skiing Corporation and the Colorado Water Conservation Board
overtly object to the appearance of Golden's application as an instream flow
application. Filed on March 3, 1999, Clear Creek Skiing Corporation's statement of
opposition to Golden's application reads: "The Colorado Water Conservation Board is
the only entity in the State of Colorado authorized to obtain minimum stream flow
water rights." Clear Creek Skiing Company Statement of Opposition, § 2(B). Also
filed on March 3, 1999, the Colorado Water Conservation Board's statement of
opposition states that the purpose of Golden's application is "similar in nature to
instream flow use;" "does not constitute a legally cognizable beneficial use of water;"
and therefore violates COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3). Colorado Water Conservation
Board Statement of Opposition, § 3(a)-(c).
23. The City of Arvada, Coors Brewing Company, and the City of Westminster
impliedly object to the instream flow nature of Golden's application. Filed on March
3,1999, the City of Arvada's statement of opposition reads: "Applicant must be placed
on strict proof with respect to each element of its claim for absolute and conditional
surface water rights including, but not limited to... [w]hether applicant can be
granted a decree for the claimed water rights." City of Arvada Statement of
Opposition, § 2(B). Filed on January 26, 1999, Coors Brewing Company's statement of
opposition states that Golden must meet the criteria for a valid appropriation and a
conditional decree, stating specifically that, "Applicant must prove that it has the
requisite authority and intent to appropriate water in accordance with the law." Coors
Brewing Company Statement of Opposition, § 2(F). Filed on March 3, 1999, The City
of Westminster's opposition statement states that: "Applicant must be held to strict
proof that it has diverted and put to beneficial use the portion of water rights claimed
as absolute." City of Westminster Statement of Opposition, § 2(D).
24. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1998); see City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation
Co., 926 P.2d 1, 93-94 (Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d
915, 930 (Colo. 1992).
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of City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins.25
Under Colorado law, an " '[a]ppropriation' means the application
of a specified portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use
pursuant to the procedures prescribed by law. '26 Colorado statute
defines "beneficial use" as: "the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate... and, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, includes the impoundment of water for recreational
purposes, including fishery and wildlife. 2 7 The statute provides that
recreational, piscatorial, fishery, and wildlife appropriations are
beneficial uses; thus, it appears likely a court will find Golden's
declared uses beneficial under Colorado law. Golden's application
names the beneficial uses to which the requested water will be put:
"[b] oating (including kayaking,
rafting and canoeing), piscatorial, and
28
general recreational uses.
The criteria for award of a conditional decree are also statutory.
Any water that "can and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured,
possessed, and controlled" satisfies the requirements for a conditional
decree. According to Golden's application, its existing eight structure
Course controls and concentrates the flow of Clear Creek for boating,
and the intended extension of the Course will do the same. Golden's
application uses language obviously intended to place the application
under the purview of the "or otherwise captured, possessed, and
controlled" language of the conditional decree statute.2 However,
even if a court finds Golden's application does not fall within that
language, Colorado statutes and case law define "diversion" broadly.
Colorado statute defines diversion as "removing water from its
natural course or location, or controllingwater in its natural course. .... "
The Colorado Supreme Court has held the "or" within the statute as
creating two discrete categories;"' thus, "diverting"-physically
removing the water from the watercourse for use 3at
2 another locationis distinct from and not required by "controlling.
25. 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992). In its application, Golden states, "Precedence (sic)
for the requested water right is specifically set forth in City of Thornton v. City of Fort
Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992) and further supported by C.R.S. §§ 37-92-305(9) (b)
and 37-92-103(7)." Golden's Application, supra note 2, at 39. Golden carefully crafted
the language in its application from the holdings of City of Thornton and applicable
statutes. Although reciting a case as precedent cannot force the hand of any court, it
must here. The similarity of Golden's application to Fort Collins' application in City of
Thornton will force a court to examine City of Thornton.
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1998).
27. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1998).
28. Golden's Application, supra note 2, at 39.
29. In describing the existing structures for which Golden seeks confirmation of
absolute water rights, Golden describes the eight structures as "designed to control
and concentrate the flow of Clear Creek." Id. at 37. Golden's description of the
intended Extension uses similar language: "The Extension will consist of
approximately 10 additional dam structures, each of which is designed to control,
concentrate, and direct the stream flow ...."Id at 38.
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (1998) (emphasis added).
31. Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942, 946 (Colo. 1990).
32. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 929-30 (Colo. 1992); see
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In City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins,3 the Colorado Supreme
Court addressed an issue strikingly similar to the one here. In City of
Thornton, the court assessed whether the appropriation of water
effectuated by two dams on the Cache La Poudre River constituted
control of water within the meaning of the statutes set out above.
After reasoning that control of water within its natural course could
constitute a valid appropriation," the court held that "water may be
appropriated by a structure or device which ...controls water within
its natural course, assuming such action puts the water to beneficial
use."5 5 Differentiating control from an instream flow, the court stated
that one of the salient features of an instream flow is absence of a
structure or device, whereas diversion or control requires a structure
36
or device.
In City of Thornton, Fort Collins intended two dams, structurally
different and serving different purposes, to satisfy their requested
appropriations. Although the first dam, the Nature Dam, built in
order to divert the Cache La Poudre River back to its historic channel,
is dissimilar from the structures at issue in Golden's application, the
court's holding with respect to the structure is important. The court
held that "to control water within its natural course or location means
that the appropriator exercises control over the water at least to the
extent that the water continues to be put to a beneficial use.""
With respect to the second structure, the Power Dam, a structure
containing both a boat chute and a fish ladder, the court held that,
"boat chutes[,] ... when properly designed and constructed, are
structures, which concentrate the flow of water to serve their intended
purposes. A chute ...therefore may qualify as a 'structure or device'
which controls water in its natural course or location under section 37'
The court remanded the case to the water court to
9 2 -10 3 ( 7 )."ss
determine if the structure can and will put the requested water to
beneficial use.
The instream flow objections to Golden's application echo the
instream flow objections in City of Thornton so much that it seems
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570, 573, 574 (Colo. 1979).
33. 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992).
34. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 930 ("Controlling water within its natural course or
location by some structure or device for a beneficial use thus may result in a valid
appropriation").
35. Id. at 930-31.
36. Id. at 931. The court also stressed that even though preservation of nature, the
beneficial use required for an instream flow, would incidentally manifest from Fort
Collins' application, this similarity in result does not qualify the application as an
application for an instream flow. Id. Furthermore, the Colorado Constitution in
article XVI, section 6 guarantees the right to appropriate water for beneficial use by
diversion or control, and the Colorado Supreme Court has held that provision as
distinct from and not in conflict with the CWCB's statutory right to appropriate water
for instream flows. Board of County Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 548 n.4 (Colo.
1992).
37. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 931-32.
38. Id. at 932.
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unlikely, if the issue is litigated, that the opposers will prevail. Golden
will have to show that the water appropriated will serve the beneficial
uses outlined in its application and that the structures will effectively
control the water (i.e., can and will put the water to the beneficial uses
named). Based on the nature of the application, these required
showings do not appear insurmountable.
Golden may trip on a few points, however. Golden's application is
factually distinct from the one at issue in City of Thornton in one crucial
way: where Fort Collins claimed water rights for only two structures,
Golden seeks water rights for eight existing and ten additional
structures, effectively spanning the course of Clear Creek as it flows
through the City of Golden. The court could possibly view this
application as a thinly veiled plan to create an expansion of river
fortressed against future appropriations, establishing Golden as the
future gatekeeper of the water of Clear Creek. 9
The court may also face the possibility that the appropriation is not
solely for the purpose of a kayak course, but a disguised private
instream flow for the purposes of waste dilution. In City of Thornton v.
Bijou Irrigation Co., the Colorado Supreme Court found that Kodak had
no right to dilute its discharges to comply with water quality standards
and, thus, frustrate a challenged exchange."0 The appropriation of
water for an environmentally appealing purpose may hide a purpose of
municipal sewage dilution.
It seems likely that a court will find Golden's stated beneficial use
meets state statutory requirements; that the structures effectively
control the water, even though the water remains within its natural
water course; and that although the application may preserve nature as
an incidental benefit, that result does not force the application under
the rubric of an instream flow.
IV. WASTE
In its statement of opposition, the Clear Creek County Board of
Commissioners requested that Golden "be put on strict proof that the
use of the amount of water claimed is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made.""
Colorado statutes define the beneficial use of water as "that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably
efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which
the appropriation is lawfully made.... ., 2 Judicial interpretation of
what constitutes waste is limited, but has established that it "is settled
law that an appropriator is limited in his use of water to his actual

39. See infra Part V.
40. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 89-95 (Colo. 1996).
41. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Clear Creek Statement of
Opposition, § 2(A) (emphasis added).
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1998) (emphasis added).
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needs. He must not waste it, and if there is a surplus remaining after
use, it must be returned to the stream whence it came.""
Golden's application may be subject to attack based on waste, or an
argument that the appropriation of essentially the entire year-round
flow of Clear Creek is not reasonable and appropriate under
reasonably efficient practices. Kayakers, of course, love water and feel
that the more water, the better. However, kayak courses can be
designed for average low water levels, as was the Confluence Kayak
Park in central Denver. The Confluence Park attracts boaters year
round at levels of less than 150 cfs, substantially lower than the levels
Golden intends to appropriate. A course such as Golden's, designed
for up to 1,000 cfs, which occurs at most four weeks per year, may not
be well designed or appropriate for use during the average normal
flow of less than 200 cfs.
The water court, when faced with the upstream implications of the
appropriation, will need to grapple with the issue of whether the size
of the new appropriation is reasonable, or if it constitutes waste of
Colorado's precious water resources.
V.

UPSTREAM IMPLICATIONS

In its statement of opposition, the Town of Georgetown requested
that Golden be placed on strict proof about, "It] he impact on Clear
Creek, to be anticipated from proposed water rights."" The upstream
implications of the appropriation are of interest to existing and
potential water users along Clear Creek. Through the act of
appropriating an amount nearly equal to all of the historical year
round flow of Clear Creek, Golden has effectively precluded the future
development ofjunior direct flow rights and upstream storage facilities
for augmentation of out of priority diversions. The appropriation will
also preclude the ability of other appropriators to operate junior
exchanges to move senior water upstream through Golden. The
immediate effect may be seen in the ability of Golden to deny
Georgetown the capacity to operate its proposed exchange from the
Farmer's Highline Ditch, just below Golden, upstream to Georgetown.
This exchange is eleven days junior to Golden's date of
appropnation.
Georgetown may now be required to find and use
senior exchange water or senior water above Georgetown. This can
only make existing absolute and conditional storage and direct flow
rights upstream of Golden more valuable, including existing
transmountain diversions, such as the Vidler Tunnel; will add value to
existing rights; and may create a viable water market along the upper
reaches of Clear Creek.
43. See Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922).
44. Town of Georgetown Statement of Opposition, § 3(E)(3).
45. See Application for Change of Use of Water Right, and for Plan for
Augmentation, Including Exchange, 98CW439, Resume, Water Division No. 1.
(December, 1998). See also the Colorado Water Rights Applications section of this
issue infra at 358.
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VI. CONCLUSION

If Golden's proposed appropriation is decreed by the water court,
the implications for various water basins statewide could be profound.
For example, one need only imagine the construction of a similar
boating course and appropriation by the City of Grand Junction at the
confluence of the Colorado and Gunnison Rivers. Through the
appropriation of the entire flow of both rivers to provide water for the
beneficial use of recreational boaters all future upstream water
development would be severely affected, if not entirely curtailed
throughout most of Western Colorado.
While the water court may be precluded from considering the
public policy implications of granting Golden what amounts to a large
instream flow right and a gatekeeping function over an entire
watershed, the legislature or the Supreme Court through judicial
interpretation of waste and reasonable use, or a review of City of
Thornton v. City of Ft. Collins, may soon be required to address this
important issue.

